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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
same party Now, a plaintiff must plead both elements of damage in
one action or he will be precluded from recovering on the omitted
element by a plea of res judicata in any subsequent action between the
same parties on the same cause.26 Where, however, the two actions are
pending simultaneously, failure of the defendant to amend his answer in
the property damage action to allege that the personal injury action is
pending constitutes a waiver of the rule against splitting a cause of
action and will prevent defendant from raising the judgment in the
property damage action as a bar to the personal injury action."
Judging by the confusion over what is and what is not dicta, it would
seem that one of the major weaknesses in giving the syllabus force of law
is that it is easy to glide over the facts of the case without determining
whether the court mistakenly included a "rule" which was not necessary
to a determination of the case. The problems that can arise from over-
emphasizing the syllabus are strikingly illustrated by the nearly twenty
years of confusion that resulted from applying paragraph four of the
Vasa syllabus as law
ROBERT L. MATIA
TORTS - AUTOMOBLES - OHIO'S ASSURED CLEAR
DISTANCE RULE
Kellerman v J S. Durzg Co., 176 Oho St. 320,
199 N.E.2d 562 (1964)
The assured clear distance rule has developed along several lines
within the various states. Some states have made the rule statutory,' and
these have tended toward strict application of the statute thereby barring
recovery to plaintiffs who have collided with unlighted objects ahead.2
In most states, however, the rule has been developed by case law' These
jurisdictions generally have allowed a greater scope of inquiry and usually
submit the issue of contributory negligence to the jury under applicable
instructions to apply the rule in the light of the surrounding carcum-
stances leading to the accident.' But at least two jurisdictions have not
accepted the rule on any basis; each case is decided on its own facts and
circumstances. 5
26. See note 23, supra.
27. It should be noted that the use of the words "personal injury action" and "property
damage action" in the Shaw syllabus is curious. Is the court saying that this rule only applies
where the property damage action is the first one filed and that the objection could not be
raised in the personal injury action to the trying of the property damage action? If this is in
fact what the court is saying, the better view would seem to be that the waiver rule should
apply regardless of whether the personal injury action or the property damage action is the
first filed.
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The Ohio assured clear distance statute has been applied in numerous
cases.7 In those cases involving collisions with discernible static objects
the statute has traditionally been strictly construed, i.e., violation of the
statute amounts to contributory negligence as a matter of law.' Hence,
recovery by plaintiffs was barred notwithstanding the nature of defend-
ants' conduct. However, the subject case of Kellerman V. J. S. Durzg
Co.9 has the effect of liberalizing the strict construction of the statute as
previously interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court. In Kellerman, plain-
tiff's decedent suffered fatal injuries when he drove his car into the left
rear corner of defendant's large tractor-trailer. The tractor-trailer had
been stopped for over an hour on the right side of a heavily traveled
highway with the left rear part of the unlighted trailer still on the traveled
portion of the road. The incident occurred just after sunset. The com-
mon pleas court directed a verdict for defendant, holding that plaintiffs
decedent had violated the assured clear distance statute and was therefore
chargeable with contributory negligence as a matter of law Hence, there
could be no recovery. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, reversed and
remanded, holding that violation of the assured clear distance statute by
1. E.g., MIcH. COMi,. LAws S 257.627 (1948); Omio REV. CODE S 4511.21 (Supp. 1964);
PA. STAT. ANN. t. 75, S 1002 (1960).
2. Lindquist v. Thierman, 216 Iowa 170, 248 N.W 504 (1933); Notananni v. Ross, 384
Pa. 63, 119 A.2d 792 (1956). See generally Annor., 97 A.L.R. 546 (1935).
3. E.g., Harrison -v. Travelers Mut. Cas. Co., 156 Kan. 492, 134 P.2d 681 (1943); Owen
Motor Freight Lines v. Russell's Adm'r, 260 Ky. 795, 86 S.W.2d 708 (1935); Robertson v.
Welch, 242 Miss. 110, 134 So. 2d 491 (1961); Waite v. Briggs, 175 Neb. 104, 120 N.W.2d
547 (1963); Burlington Transp. Co. v. Wilson, 61 Nev. 22, 114 P.2d 1094 (1941); Tyson
v. Ford, 228 N.C. 778, 47 S.E.2d 251 (1948); Hastings v. Soule, 118 Vt. 105, 100 A.2d
577 (1955).
4. Rozycki v. Yahtic Grain & Prod. Co., 99 Conn. 711, 122 Ad. 717 (1923); Kirk v. United
Gas Pub. Serv., 185 La. 580, 170 So. 1 (1936); Welch v. Stowell, 121 Vt. 381, 159 A.2d
75 (1960). See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS S 17.2, at 974 n.20 (1956).
5. Marshall v. Sellers, 188 Md. 508, 53 A.2d 5 (1947); Johnson v. Lee Way Motor Freight,
261 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1953).
6. The statute reads in part: "No person shall operate a motor vehicle at a speed greater
or less than is reasonable or proper and no person shall drive any motor vehicle at
a greater speed than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance
ahead." OHIO REV. CODE § 4511.21 (Supp. 1964).
7. E.g., Cox v. Polster, 174 Ohio St. 224, 188 N.E.2d 421 (1963); Whitaker v. Baum-
gardner, 167 Ohio St. 167, 146 N.E.2d 729 (1957); Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co., 158
Oio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3 (1941); Skinner v. Pennsylvania R.R., 127 Ohio St. 69, 186 N.E.
722 (1933).
8. Buster v. Baltimore & O.R.R. 252 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1958); Whitaker v. Baumgardner,
167 Ohio St. 167, 146 N.E.2d 729 (1957); Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St.
81, 33 N.E.2d 3 (1941); Kormos v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471,
3 N.E.2d 427 (1936); Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 200 N.E.
843 (1936); Gumley v. Cowman, 129 Ohio St. 36, 193 N.E. 627 (1934); Skinner v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 127 Ohio St. 69, 186 N.E. 722 (1933). Accord, Cox v. Polster, 174 Ohio St.
224, 188 N.E.2d 421 (1963); McFadden v. Elmer C. Breuer Transp. Co., 156 Ohio St. 430,
103 N.E.2d 385 (1952).
9. 176 Ohio St. 320, 199 N.E.2d 562 (1964).
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plaintiff's decedent would not bar recovery should wanton misconduct 0
be found on the part of the defendant.
This interpretation by the supreme court does not overrule prior de-
cisions involving the assured clear distance statute." It does, however,
represent a marked departure from the view taken in the controversial
case of Smiley v Arrow Spring Bed Co. 2 In the Smiley case, the plain-
tiff drove his car into the rear end of defendant's truck which was parked
without lights at night on the traveled portion of the road thirty feet be-
yond the crest of a hill. Plaintiff was also blinded by the lights of an
oncoming vehicle at the moment he came over the crest of the hill. In
denying plaintiff recovery on the ground he had been contributorily neg-
ligent as a matter of law for violating the statute, the court said:
The statute is a safety regulation and imposes upon the operator of a
motor vehide at all times the unqualified obligation to be able to stop
his car within the distance that discernible objects may be seen. By
force of the statute the motorist may therefore assume nothing that is
not assured to him by the range of his vision.' s
In essence the court said in Smiley that a plaintiff motorist in Ohio must
anticipate unlawful maneuvers on the part of others in calculating the
assured dear distance ahead. If his calculation is wrong and a collision
occurs he will be found contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The
Kellerman decision affirmed this requirement, but also placed a burden
of anticipation on the defendant. There, the court said that the defen-
dant must also anticipate the unlawful act of the plaintiff, i.e., of violat-
ing the assured clear distance statute. If he fails to so anticipate plaintiff's
10. "Wanton misconduct is such conduct as manifests a disposition to perversity, and it
must be under such surrounding circumstances and existing conditions that the party doing
the act or failing to act must be conscious, from his knowledge of such surrounding circum-
stances and existing conditions, that his conduct will in all probability result in injury." Uni-
versal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 200 N.E. 843 (1936). See generally
Annot., 119 A.L.R. 654 (1939), Annot., 92 A.LR. 1367 (1934); Annot, 72 A..R. 1357
(1931); 6 OHio JUR. 2d, Automobiles § 226 (1954)
11. Only in Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 200 N.E. 843(1936), was the issue of wanton misconduct on the part of defendant raised, and in that case
the evidence did not support the charge. This was the only case found in any jurisdiction in
which wanton misconduct was raised as a defense to contributory negligence for violation of
the assured clear distance rule. However, in Inter-City Trucking Co. v. Daniels, 181 Tenn.
126, 178 S.W.2d 756 (1944), the defendant was deprived of his defense of contributory
negligence on the ground that his conduct indicated a gross disregard of the rights of others
when he left his truck parked and unlighted in the road. The court labeled this conduct
"gross or wanton negligence."
12. 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3 (1941). "No statute in Ohio has received a construction
more strict and harsh than was applied to this statute by the Supreme Court in Smiley v.
Arrow Spring Bed Co." Spangenberg, Developments ;n the Law of Wanton Misconduct and
Nuisance in Relation to the Assured Clear Distance Ahead Rule, 23 OHIo BAR Ass'N REP.
227 (1950).
13. 138 Oho St. 81, 88-89, 33 N.E.2d 3, 7 (1941) But see Tyson v. Ford, 228 N.C. 778,
47 S.E.2d 251 (1948)
[Vol 16:446
Ohio Assured Clear Distance Rule
unlawful act he may be found guilty of wanton misconduct and conse-
quently will lose his defense of contributory negligence.
The majority of jurisdictions in the Umted States do not require a
motorist to anticipate negligence on the part of another motorist.14 The
general view is that motorists have a right to assume that other motorists
will exercise reasonable care and caution under the circumstances to avoid
collision, and will obey applicable traffic regulations and rules of the
road.'5 The position of Ohio is therefore inconsistent in theory with the
majority, but the effect of Kelerman in requiring the issue of wanton
misconduct to be submitted to the jury where the evidence construed
most strongly in favor of the plaintiff shows wanton misconduct- acts to
liberalize the Ohio rule. This may be evidenced by the fact that prior to
Kellerman the Ohio courts in applying the rule strictly had given little
consideration to the nature of defendant's conduct 6 and to special con-
ditions and factors of excuse such as ram and fog,"T or mud on the parked
vehicle making it less discernible, 8 or the glare of headlights of oncom-
ing vehicles.' 9 Therefore, if the rationale of the Kellerman decision had
been applied to the facts in Smiley, it is quite possible that plaintiff's re-
covery would not have been barred, since in Smiley there appears to have
been sufficient evidence for submission of the issue of wanton misconduct
14. Page v. Mazzel, 213 Cal. 644, 3 P.2d 11 (1931); Kaufman v. Hegeman Transfer &
Lighterage Terminal, Inc., 100 Conn. 114, 123 Ad. 116 (1923); Kadlec v. Johnson Constr.
Co., 217 Iowa 299, 252 N.W 103 (1933); Weil v. Kreutzer, 134 Ky. 563, 121 S.W 471
(1909); Davis v. Simpson, 138 Me. 137, 23 A.2d 320 (1941); Bell v. Crook, 168 Neb.
685, 97 N.W.2d 352 (1959); Griffeth v. Pound, 357 P.2d 965 (Okla. 1960); Senger v.
Vancouver-Portland Bus Co., 209 Ore. 37, 298 P.2d 835 (1956).
15. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Crooks, 188 Ark. 513, 67 S.W.2d 193 (1934); Langner
v. Cawness, 238 Iowa 774, 28 N.W.2d 421 (1947); Keir v. Trager, 134 Kan. 505, 7 P.2d
49 (1932); Foster v. Curtis, 213 Mass. 79, 99 N.E. 961 (1912); Schmitt v. Emery, 211
Minn. 547,2 N.W.2d 413 (1942); Barrett v. Alamito Dairy Co., 105 Neb. 658, 191 N.W 550
(1921); Garner v. Pittman, 237 N.C. 328, 75 S.E.2d 111 (1953); Wilson v. Bittner, 129
Ore. 122, 276 Pac. 268 (1929); Inter-City Trucking Co. v. Daniels, 181 Tenn. 126, 178
S.W.2d 756 (1944); Mosso v. E. H. Stanton Co., 75 Wash. 220, 134 Pac. 941 (1913); Bur-
dette v. Henson, 96 W Va. 31, 122 S.E. 356 (1924). Prior to the enactment of the assured
clear distance statute in 1929, the Ohio Supreme Court had held that it was not negligence
per se to drive a car at such a rate of speed as to be unable to stop within the range of the
headlights at night. Instead it was held to be a question for the jury to determine if the
driver was negligent, and if so whether his negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.
Tresise v. Ashdown, 118 Ohio St. 307, 160 N.E. 898 (1928). Compare Marchal v. Frank-
man, 58 N.E.2d 679 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943), with Spreng v. Flaherty, 40 Ohio App. 21, 177
N.E. 528 (1931).
16. E.g., Whitaker v. Baumgardner, 167 Ohio St. 167, 146 N.E.2d 729 (1957); Smiley v.
Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3 (1941); Kormos v. Cleveland Retail
Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.2d 427 (1936). But see Notarianni v. Ross, 384
Pa. 63, 66, 119 A.2d 792, 794 (1956) (dissenting opinion)
17. Woods v. Brown's Bakery, 171 Ohio St. 383, 171 N.E.2d 496 (1960); Gumley v.
Cowman, 129 Ohio St. 36, 193 N.E. 627 (1934); Skinner v. Pennsylvania R.R., 127 Ohio
St 69, 186 N.E. 722 (1933). See also Annot., 42 A.LR.2d 13 (1955).
18. Kormos v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St 471, 3 N.E.2d 427 (1936).
19. bid. See also Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 292 (1952).
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